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Persistent peasant poverty and assets. Exploring dynamics of
new forms of wealth and poverty in Tanzania 1999–2018
Dan Brockington
SIID, University of Sheﬃeld, Sheﬃeld, UK
ABSTRACT
Tracking change in rural communities over time is diﬃcult. It is also
important. If we are to understand what forms of peasant poverty
persist, or how and in what ways peasant communities can
become richer, then we require longitudinal studies. These are
however few. It is diﬃcult to access the data required for them.
I present one case using assets to track growing prosperity.
I examine why exclusions in other data make tracking assets
important, and the limitations of longitudinal research for
capturing contemporary conditions.
KEYWORDS
Assets; longitudinal surveys;
persistent poverty; Tanzania
Introduction
The problem of persistent peasant poverty has been a leitmotif of peasant studies for
decades. The question typically has two dimensions – why are peasants poor, and why
do they persist in their poverty? Understanding these issues is fundamental to understand-
ing the operation of rural capitalism and accumulation, and the welfare of billions of
people.
A number of recent contributions to debates about peasant poverty generally, and to
Tanzanian rural poverty in particular, are signiﬁcant for the data sources on which they
have based their arguments. They have relied upon changes in the number of people
below poverty lines as determined by records of expenditure. This is a problem because
these data necessarily exclude forms of peasant prosperity (speciﬁcally investment in pro-
ductive assets) which can be particularly important in local measures of wealth and
poverty.
I argue in this paper that assets matter to rural smallholders and that investment in
assets is systematically and deliberately excluded from calculations of poverty lines
based on consumption data. These arguments should not surprise readers of this
journal, however, there is a risk that they have been overlooked in recent debates.
These observations are based on an unusual longitudinal dataset that follows the for-
tunes of rural families over a 16 year period. This shows that there has been change to
infrastructure and commodity markets which has brought improvements for speciﬁc
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rural families. Yet I then show that village society has changed substantially such that
only a minority of villagers are now in a position to beneﬁt from the new changes to
the economy.
Assets, economic transformation and persistent peasant poverty
The central premise of the recent edited collection Peasant poverty in the twenty-ﬁrst
century (Boltvinik and Mann 2016b) is that there is no doubt that peasant poverty has per-
sisted, if not increased, in recent decades. The editors establish the basic facts of peasant
poverty succinctly. They used global poverty line data (derived from expenditure), and well
known critiques of them (Ravallion 2010; Reddy and Pogge 2010), to argue that current
poverty lines are set too low. The World Bank’s poverty line ($1.90 per day) shows that
poverty has fallen. But under the more realistic measures of $2.50 per day the proportion
of people in that category increased by 13 percentage points between 1980 and 2005
(Boltvinik and Mann 2016a).
A similar approach is found in Mashindano and colleagues’ investigation of persistent
rural poverty in Tanzania (Mashindano et al. 2013). They found that the number of people
living beneath the low poverty lines set by the World Bank and Tanzanian government
(again using consumption data) had not declined despite years of economic growth.
They concluded that this growth, rooted in the mining, infrastructure and tourist
sectors, was simply not beneﬁting rural areas (Nord et al. 2009; Robinson, Gaertner, and
Papageorgiou 2011; Adam, Collier, and Ndulu 2017). The lead authors concluded that
[i]n Tanzania the critical question is why has rapid growth in Tanzania not been accompanied
by a corresponding fall in poverty? Why have the numbers of impoverished risen? (Mashin-
dano and Shepherd 2013, 3)
I do not dispute the facts that poverty rates as counted by such measures are so high, par-
ticularly given that poverty lines are set too low (cf. Pogge 2008). However, it is important
to remind readers that there are signiﬁcant problems in resting arguments about persist-
ent peasant poverty in an uncritical acceptance of poverty lines built from consumption
data. This is because such poverty lines necessarily exclude any investment in, or purchase
of, productive assets.
A brief aside is necessary here on the techniques used in constructing poverty lines
from consumption data. The poverty lines we refer to are drawn from Household
Budget Surveys. These data are cleaned of outliers and used to calculate the average
daily per capita expenditure. It is from such statistics that we derive the proportion of
the population who spend less than $1.90, or $2.50, per day.
But these calculations deliberately exclude all production costs, that is the costs
entailed in creating any income. If a farmer is managing a 100 acre farm, then the
survey will not try to capture her costs of ploughing, planting, weeding or harvesting it.
It captures use of the income resulting from such activity. The survey would also similarly
not record any purchase of new land, or ploughs or oxen, or seeds or labour for smaller
farmers. These too are production costs.
The instructions with respect to production costs are unambiguous. The World Bank’s
guidance states that:
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Care must be taken not to interpret spending on inputs into household production, including
outlays for tools or other inputs like fertilizer, water, or seed in agricultural production, as
spending for consumption or as income. If we included spending on in-puts in the consump-
tion or income aggregate, we would overstate the actual welfare levels achieved by house-
holds. (Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon 2002: 32)
In the Tanzania’s 2011/12 Household Budget Survey the nature of the exclusions is clearer
from the schedule of ‘COICOP’ codes used.1 This provides an exhaustive list of all diﬀerent
types of expenditure recorded in a consumption survey, including food, clothing, house
costs, furniture, education, water, electricity, insurance and even money spent on prostitu-
tion. But it does not include any purchase of land. Nor does it allow for the purchase of
ploughs, power tillers or tractors. Livestock purchase is only recorded if the animal is to
be used for meat. Veterinary services are only recorded for pets, not herds, and fertiliser
and other inputs for gardens not farms. It is impossible to mention investment in pro-
ductive assets because there are no codes for them.
Investment in productive assets is not the only thing that would be missed. As we have
pointed out elsewhere (Brockington et al. 2018), expensive purchases are excluded
because they are outliers, and skew the data. Indeed in the published COICOP codes
there is no entry for house construction. So if a family invests in building a new house,
or putting a new roof on it, then that cannot be captured in this survey.2
This means therefore that a frugal family, which was restricting day-to-day expenditure
in order to save for assets, would appear poor, even if it was also purchasing land, oxen,
ploughs and diverse inputs.3 It is therefore problematic to use Tanzanian poverty line data
to track poverty dynamics in rural areas because it cannot see some changes in rural pros-
perity that are important for rural people.
Does this matter? I believe it does. As we have argued in the companion papers, and
elsewhere (Östberg et al. 2018; Brockington et al. 2019; Howland, Noe, and Brockington
2019) productive assets are crucial to local deﬁnitions of wealth and poverty. In Tanzania
rural wealth and poverty are measured in terms of lands worked, livestock owned and
used, houses built (and these days children educated). There is a rich literature, discussed
in more depth in the companion papers, which shows that assets are crucial for under-
standing poverty traps, investment decisions and long term poverty dynamics (Carter
and Barrett 2006; Scott 2010; Liverpool-Tasiea and Winter-Nelson 2011; Carter and
Lybbert 2012; Naschold 2012; Barrett and Carter 2013).
As I will show in this paper, investment in assets is central to peasant strategies of self-
improvement. The seasonal income in many peasant households makes asset purchase
sensible, lest it be stolen or frittered away on ephemeral needs. As one focus group
member put it:
We get money seasonally. Some people… after the harvest they buy a TV, or solar panels, or
all manner of things and they have a good life. But [later] although she’s got her television, if
she… needs 50,000 shillings she’ll have to wait 5 months. In July if you want to borrow a
1COICOP refers to ‘Classiﬁcation of Individual Codes by Purpose’ for the purposes of recording consumption (see UN
Statistics Division 2019). A copy of the list of COICOP codes used is in the author’s possession.
2I must correct here a mistake made in that earlier publication where I stated that investment in assets, such as land or large
livestock, might be excluded if the asset was expensive, and so the expenditure would appear as an outlier. They would
be excluded, but for the prior reason that any expenditure on such assets would be classiﬁed as productive.
3Investment in agricultural assets is recorded elsewhere in the survey, but these are not assigned COICOP codes and are not
included in the indices of family consumption.
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million shillings she will give it, but go to them in November and ask to borrow 200,000… and
they will tell you I have nothing, I have bought a TV, I’ve bought a plot, I’ve bought bricks.
(Focus Group Kilwa 22 February 2017; 50,000 shillings is about $20)
This would not mean that any family saving to purchase assets is actually well-oﬀ but just
looks poor. As I will show below, and as should be plain anyway, having to scrimp and save
to acquire or conserve assets is an aspect of poverty. Himanshu and colleagues observed
in Palanpur, an Indian village that has been studied for 60 years, one of the most marked
changes, even in a population which was characterised by considerable poverty, was an
investment in assets and people’s houses (Himanshu, Lanjouw, and Stern 2018). As Lord
Stern, one of Himanshu’s co-authors put it at a book launch, it is remarkable how the
poorest people are still able to save and invest. Expenditure on assets cannot be
conﬂated with being wealthy.
However given that such investments are so important in rural eyes, andgiven their impor-
tance to many families’ strategies to become richer, we need debates about rural poverty
dynamics to consider these changes. This is certainly apparent in some debates, including
the pages of this journal (Assies 2009; Garikipati 2009; Singh 2009; Ribot 2014). But discussion
of assets is not prominent in recent debates about the diverse forms of dispossession, primi-
tive accumulation, rural diﬀerentiation and growing inequality aﬄicting many African
countries following economic growth strategies that privilege overseas investment (Hall
2011; Scoones et al. 2013; Wolford et al. 2013; Ansoms and Hilhorst 2014; Greco 2015).
The critics of these processes are unambiguous. Just over 30 years ago Shivji predicted
that the consequences of economic transformation and capital investment in Tanzania
would include concentration of prime agricultural land into the hands of foreign corpor-
ations, rapid development of a landless rural class, massive migration to urban areas, and
high inequality with ‘sprawling cities full of luxury consumer goods’ with ‘millions of mar-
ginalised unemployed masses on the verge of starvation’ (Shivji 1987, 128; cited in Shivji
2017, 5–6.). Looking back at the prediction now, he thinks he was too close to the mark
‘[o]ne wishes… one would have proved wrong!’ (Shivji 2017, 6). He feels these predictions
have ‘come close’ to fulﬁlment in Tanzania and are uncannily close to reality for Africa as a
whole. Elsewhere he speaks of the peasantry being ‘ﬂushed’ out of land, and of processes
of primitive accumulation driving marginalisation (Wuyts 2008, 1088).
Shivji’s arguments emphasise that it is possible that rural povertymay be enhanced because
of the growth strategies being pursued. The problems of land alienation are marked in Tanza-
nia, where green grabs for wildlife conservation (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012) and
REDD+ (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2017) are combining
with mining concessions and agricultural investment corridors to render large swathes of
the country inhospitable to rural residents (Bluwstein et al. 2018). The Tanzanian government’s
boast that it has surveyed nearly 400 villages to identify 900,000 hectares that can be alienated
to foreign investors (Hon Minister for Lands 2012) alarmed observers.
In sharp contrast Jayne and colleagues have recently described a general economic
transformation of numerous (but not all) poor African countries that is built-in increased
rural productivity and associated prosperity (Jayne, Chamberlin, and Benﬁca 2018).
Alwyn Young has suggested that trajectories in numerous assets give grounds to speak
of an ‘African growth miracle’ (Young 2012).4 In Tanzania speciﬁcally the economy has
4For critiques of this work see Johnston and Abreu (2016) and our companion paper (Howland, Noe, and Brockington 2019).
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averaged 7% annual growth (Nord et al. 2009, 1). That growth has been accompanied by
macro-economic stability and increased public spending (Robinson, Gaertner, and Papa-
georgiou 2011). It is celebrated as part of a rising continent.
It is in this context of rapidly changing rural economies, apparent economic growth and
disputed consequences of this growth that I call for more attention to rural people’s assets.
Exploring this aspect of peasant livelihoods adds ﬂesh to Henry Bernstein’s objection to
Boltvinik’s work on persistent peasant poverty. Bernstein argued that:
there is little in the way of empirical illustration, especially an exploration of patterns and
dynamics of rural class relations and poverty and the challenges of investigating them…
the assumption of generalised persistent/’permanent’ rural poverty,… gives no analytical pur-
chase on such questions as: why are some farmers/rural people not poor? Which and why?
What are the trends in rural poverty? (Bernstein 2016, 173, emphasis in the original)
Examining asset dynamics in poor rural Tanzanian locations may provide a means of
answering those questions. This paper illustrates the importance of asset dynamics, and
the omissions of poverty line data by asking ‘what insights do we gain into rural
poverty dynamics by tracking investment in productive assets’?
Exploring asset dynamics over time in Tanzania
Tracing change in assets in rural Tanzania is diﬃcult. It is possible to conduct separate
surveys of the same place over diﬀerent time periods. But this suﬀers from the obvious
disadvantage that we do not know whether or not we are surveying the same people.
A village may appear richer simply because the poorer residents have moved away, or
even died, because of their poverty.
To speak about change with authority requires panel or longitudinal research. This
entails visiting the same families and communities over a sustained period of time and
seeing what has changed for speciﬁc individuals and domestic units (Baulch and Hoddi-
nott 2000; Baulch 2011a, 2011b; Vandergeest and Rigg 2012).5
However, the central diﬃculty in Tanzania, and many African countries, is that there are
simply hardly any panel data, or longitudinal datasets. The Living Standards Measurement
Survey of Tanzania does provide a panel of several thousand families. But it is only nation-
ally representative, it does not follow individual places in suﬃcient depth to examine the
detail of particular contexts. More importantly it only began in 2008 and cannot provide
insights into how rural fortunes changed during the long period of economic growth
that began in the early 1990s. The Kageera study (of north-east Tanzania) does cover
that period, and with authority, covering several thousand homes that were visited
three times between the early 1990s and 2004 (De Weerdt 2010; Beegle, De Weerdt,
and Dercon 2011). However it is only available for that one region.
Given this dearth in data we needmore studies exploring change over time in rural Tan-
zania. It is this gap that the present paper seeks to ﬁll. It is part of a broader research
project which has tried systematically to co-ordinate the development of longitudinal
research into livelihood change and asset dynamics across the country (Brockington
and Noe Forthcoming; Brockington 2019). The central technique here is to identify
5Panels are, strictly speaking, visited relatively frequently, every two to three years. Longitudinal studies entail longer
breaks between the research visits.
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communities that were surveyed by researchers in the past. We then revisit these commu-
nities, and the same families that were originally surveyed, to explore how their lives have
changed.
The methods of this project combine quantitative surveys with qualitative interviews and
focus groups. Surveys uses a mixture of standard questions, across all study sites, and others
that were speciﬁc to researchers’ interests. More qualitative interviews then examine how
families fortunes have changed, and reﬂect on what has caused any changes found
between the present visit and the original survey. In particular we consider changes to
the constitution and nature of the domestic unit we were re-visiting. We discuss how
changes experienced have might have been distributed within them. This same question
we discuss at village-level focus groups (men and women separately), which examine the
history of change in the village over time, and how the understanding and meaning of
wealth has altered. We also conduct participatory wealth rankings of the village in order
to compare our re-visited sample to the proﬁle of the contemporary village population.
Finally, after we have analysed the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst visit, we return to the village to
discuss what we found and ask members of the community to reﬂect on the ﬁndings.
In the research reported here, I re-visited Mtowisa, in Rukwa region. Mtowisa is found in
the Rift Valley, close to the regional capital of Sumbawanga. I had lived there for a year in
1999–2000 as part of a post-doctoral research fellowship in which I studied the conse-
quences of the immigration of wealthy Sukuma agro-pastoralists, who brought with
them large herds, new crops and farming methods and who had been integrating into
the area for over 20 years (Brockington 2001, 2008, 2006).
I made two return trips to Mtowisa, in August 2016 and April 2018. The ﬁrst was to conduct
the resurvey, the second to follow up and present ﬁndings to villagers. In the course of these
trips, I revisited with assistants and 64 families, and interviewed local shopkeepers and district
government oﬃcials. I also interviewed businessmen who were based in Dar es Salaam and
who purchased crops in Rukwa. I travelled to neighbouring villages and ﬁshing camps with
friends, visited new irrigation schemes, held three village meetings (for women and men in
2016 and a collective feedback meeting in 2018) as well as meetings with local leaders. I now
remain in touch by phone and WhatsApp with friends who live there.
This work produced a survey that is more robust than most. Normally, longitudinal re-
visits have no choice as to which families they include in their surveys. They have to go
back to the sample originally selected in the ﬁrst round of the survey. A typical sample
size of many surveys is only 30 families (see for example Ellis and Mdoe 2003; Anders-
son-Djurfeldt, Dzanku, and Isinika 2018). Being conﬁned to the same 30 families can intro-
duce problems of attrition (Dercon and Shapiro 2007; Baulch 2011b). It can be necessary to
abandon re-visits because we cannot ﬁnd enough of the original families to merit continu-
ing with the enterprise.
However, the great advantage of the original survey that I conducted in Mtowisa is that
it was not a sample. I surveyed the entire village, covering just over 400 families.6
To conduct the revisit I then sampled families from that original survey, stratifying the
6We did not capture, however, the wealthy Sukuma agro-pastoral households who lived out beyond the margins of the
village with large cattle herds. This re-study has therefore not been able to track the changing fortunes of the families
who were the wealthiest in this area in 1999–2000 and who appeared, anecdotally, to have remained wealthy in 2016.
However given the focus of this paper on the impact of economic growth on the rural poor this gap in the survey does
not vitiate the ﬁndings.
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population into groups according to key aspects of wealth relevant in 2000. This made it
easier to deal with the problem of attrition because, if I was unable to visit a particular
family, I could then re-select a diﬀerent representative of that group from the original
population. The nature and targets for each group, and the actual numbers achieved,
are shown in Table 1.
Since I was able to replace missing families the problem of attrition recedes, but note
the patterns in it. First there are older families who’s heads had died, and had dispersed by
the time of the revisit (Table 2). A second group were those who had been younger, and
who had moved away by the time of the revisit. These two groups had opposite ten-
dencies with respect to ownership of herds and ploughs, with the younger groups
tending to be poorer, and the older groups richer.
A key assumption of our methods, discussed in a companion paper which reviews
these methods, is that domestic units were suﬃciently stable to make a re-survey of
assets owned by families worthwhile (Brockington et al. 2019). This proved to be the
case here as there were only four incidences of divorce. The sample however contains
a larger than normal group of domestic units headed by single women (18 out of 64 or
28%), whereas only 14% had this characteristic in 2000. This is because I interviewed a
relatively large number of widows whose husbands had died; I also interviewed 3
widowers.
There is one a crucial diﬀerence between the sample taken in 2016 and the survey of
2000: all the domestic units heads I re-visited are now 16 years older. None was under 35
years old. The ﬁndings that I report below are therefore not representative of younger
families in the village. To control for this diﬀerence all the comparisons of asset ownership
reported below compare domestic unit heads who are over 35 now, with domestic unit
heads who were over 35 in 2000. If I simply compared the sample of 2016 with the
entire village in 2000 I would be comparing the condition of an older sample in 2016,
with that of a much younger population from 2000. The latter could appear poorer
because if its relative youth, the former wealthier due its seniority (as Table 2 implies).
Table 1. Sampling of diﬀerent social groups.
Characteristics in 2000 Count in 2000 Visited 2016 Moved 2016 Died 2016
Owned livestock or a plough 157 24 5 8
No livestock or plough ownership 254 40 18 8
Total 411 64 23 16
Notes: 30 families is the norm for this work but I wanted as large a sample size as possible. I visited over 60 families because
I had the time to do so. I also enjoyed the work. The year spent in the village in 2000 had been challenging and rewarding
and it was good to be able to catch up again with old acquaintances.
Source: Author’s Data.
Table 2. Characteristics of surveyed, deceased, moved and unsurveyed families from 2000 data.
Group Mean age of du head in 2000 Mean plough ownership in 2000 Mean cattle ownership in 2000
Died 54 0.31 2.81
Moved 36.3 0.04 0.17
Surveyed 40.6 0.14 0.66
Not Surveyed 40.5 0.54 0.75
Notes: Kruskal-Wallis tests ﬁnd no signiﬁcance diﬀerence in the number of cattle (p = 0.32) or ploughs (p = 0.07) owned
by families that were surveyed, that were missed, or that died, but the diﬀerence in mean of household head’s age is
signiﬁcant (p = 0.03).
Source: Author’s Data.
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This would mean I would be comparing a population that is more likely to be poor because
of its stage in the domestic cycle, with one that is more likely to be rich for the same
reason. This would lead to a false impression of improving prosperity.
Changes from 2000 to 2016
Initial poverty and subsequent transformation
If ever there was an archetypal place to examine persistent peasant poverty, then it would
be Mtowisa. The village is not far, as the crow ﬂies, from the regional capital of Sumba-
wanga, which is barely 15 km away. But the ﬂying crow has an easier route than
humans, as it can soar over the 1200 m escarpment that separates the town from the
village. In 2000, residents had to walk between the two, headloading baskets of ﬁsh or
fruit for sale. The road between them was poor, and in the wet season would be cut oﬀ
by the rivers draining the Fipa plateau. This was a village that felt far from anywhere.
Its residents felt they were poor. It was expensive to transport crops and so prices were
low. Productivity was also low, with most people being only small-scale farmers, cultivat-
ing 2 acres or so. Despite abundant unused lands, farming activity increased only margin-
ally with the age of the domestic unit head, or with family size. It was diﬃcult to sell surplus
and some feared ‘bad jealousy’ i.e. retribution from neighbours that success might
occasion (cf. Foster 1965). Visible signs of wealth were few. Most lived in simple grass-
roofed houses. Only 20% of families owned cattle and then but small herds; there were
few ploughs.
I must not paint a picture of abject poverty. Just over half of resident adult men (54%)
had owned cattle at some point in their lifetimes. The place was blessed by fertile soils,
plentiful lands, reasonably reliable rains, a lake full of ﬁsh, grasslands with low tick
burdens, and a game reserve that was not well guarded on the other side of the lake.
Mtowisa may have been hard to get to from the regional capital, but it was still only a
(long) day’s walk there and back, and it was possible to headload up a basket of dried
ﬁsh or chickens and earn enough in a day to pay the various government taxes required
at the time for a whole year. Some farmers cultivated rice as a cash crop when the rivers
ﬂooded in the wet season, and one or two had constructed their own irrigation ditches to
channel river water to their farms more reliably. Moreover, there was a particularly wealthy
group of farmers in the region, Sukuma immigrants from further north, who managed
huge herds of cattle (numbering into the thousands) and large areas of land (Brockington
2001, 2008, 2006). Their arrival had brought changes to farming practices (encouraging
ploughing) as well as changes to the crops grown: maize had recently replaced ﬁnger
millet as the main staple, sunﬂowers and rice were being grown more frequently. It had
also brought tensions and greater risks for smaller farmers as their farms were vulnerable
to livestock damage for which there was rarely compensation.
But the main point remains. Most people were poor. They did not have the means to
cultivate much land, and could not earn good prices for their produce.7 Many people
remained orientated to subsistence rather than commercial production.
7As Table 2 shows it was possible to accumulate livestock, land and other assets, but this required time - and good luck. I
had many records of people who would spend a year or more of their youth as herd boys for Sukuma cattle owners, and
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What happened to such poverty in the 16 years between my visits? This was a period of
strong economic growth nationally, and, as we have seen, the beneﬁts of that growth are
thought not to have ﬁltered down to rural areas. Does Mtowisa exemplify these trends or
defy them?
At ﬁrst sight the changes to the village appeared remarkable. The village centre was
transformed. I had known it as a sleepy place with a few shops and a small hospital,
where cars came infrequently (barely once a month), and motorbikes were rare. Now
there were numerous shops, nearly 20 motorbike taxis, gas and electric welding (the
latter run on a powerful generator), several phone shops and a well-equipped hardware
store. The hospital had an operating theatre and there were solar powered lights.
The village was much less isolated. There is a large phone tower in the village (since
2008). The road between Mbeya and Sumbawanga had just been metalled (completed
in 2014); there was also now an improved road between Sumbawanga and Mtowisa
with good bridges across the rivers that could be used all year round (this was completed
in 2007). There was a regular bus service in the dry season along the length of the valley,
and a daily bus service to Sumbawanga (which had started in 2013) as well as smaller
hiaces throughout the day (since 2015).
There was an abundance of metal roofed homes, and many single rooms were rented.
Numerous pigs roamed the streets or were kept in small compounds near people’s houses
(these had been unusual in 2000). The small irrigation furrows I had encountered had
expanded in number. In the dry season they were now used (since about 2012) to cultivate
tomatoes, cabbage and onions and there were around 10 petrol powered pumps which
withdrew river water for nearby farms.
But these ﬁrst impressions can be misleading. We cannot be sure if the people enjoying
these trappings of wealth were poor or not without a more detailed revisit. It is not reason-
able to assume that the wealth that was so conspicuous in the town centres is shared by all
residents. This is precisely the sort of road-based bias against which Robert Chambers
(1981) warned so many years ago. 20 motorbike taxis would not indicate that Mtowisa’s
peasants have become richer. It just indicates that 20 people now own (or rent) motor-
bikes. Does this appearance of wealth reﬂect real change for the village’s residents?
The sesame seed cash injection
The brief answer to that question is a resounding ‘yes’, but only for some. The survey data
shows substantial improvements in productive assets over the sixteen year period. The
research into asset history and acquisition shows that this prosperity has been driven
by changing farming practices. Residents are selling more cash crops, speciﬁcally
sunﬂower seeds and sesame, with the latter providing the most substantial change.
The evidence for this change is as follows. First, with respect to key measures of herd and
plough ownership the sample visited is wealthier than it was in the past and compared to the
group of similar aged domestic unit heads in 2000 (Table 3). Oxen ownership has increased
by half (and if we include oxen borrowed from wealthy patrons it doubles to 41%). Pig own-
ership has increased dramatically, and ownership of ploughs has more than doubled.
receive in return one cow or ox in payment (an annual salary of about $50), only then to lose the animal to disease or
overworking it.
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Second, with respect to farming activity, people are simply farming more. Farming
activity increases more with family size than it did previously (Figure 1). All families are
farming more cash crops, with proportionally less maize grown than before (Table 4).
Third, housing quality has improved, particularly with the spread of metal rooﬁng.8 This
may not just reﬂect a preference for metal rooﬁng, or greater ability to buy it. The
increased cattle numbers in the region, combined with loss of grassland over several
decades to forest regrowth, and the increase in farmed area means that good thatching
grass (which lasts 5–10 years) is hard to get. People instead are reliant on rice straw
(which lasts one year) or lake reeds (lasting two). Moreover thatched houses are more
likely to catch ﬁre and they harbour vermin. They are also, perforce, smaller than metal
roofed houses, to reduce the eﬀort of collecting the thatch required for large houses.
Houses with metal roofs can be subdivided into a family home and rentable rooms.9
Finally a metal roof is a status symbol, a visible sign of prosperity.
Table 3. Key assets, 2000 and 2016.
Group Cattle Goats Pigs Ploughs N
Sample in 2016 41% 38% 16% 38% 64
Population in 2000 20% 35% 0% 17% 219
Notes: Note cattle include oxen borrowed from wealthy land owners. Diﬀerences in cattle, pigs and ploughs are statistically
signiﬁcant: cattle χ2= 11.84, p = 0.001; pigs χ2 = 35.47, p < 0.001; ploughs χ2= 16.04, p < 0.001; df = 2 in all cases.
Source: Author’s Data. Note the Population in 2000 excludes family heads less than 35 years old.
Figure 1. Family size and farming activity 2000 and 2016.
Notes: Comparing farm size by family size category shows a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence χ2 = 24.34, df = 8, p = 0.005.
Source: Author’s data.
8On Google Earth I counted the appearance of metal roofs from 8/10/2003 (the ﬁrst image available) to 7/10/13 (the last
image). In Mtowisa in 2003 there were 91 metal roofed structures. A further 442 new metal roofed structures were built
by October 2013.
9Providing a useful extra income of 8000–12,000/= per month (US$3.5–$4.5).
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Asset histories repeatedly brought out the fact that people had been able to invest in
homes and farming equipment because of better returns on crops, particularly since 2010
(Table 5). The main reason for that growth in investment, as Figure 2 shows, is the
increased sales of sesame and sunﬂower seed. Sesame appeared in small quantities in
2007 and 2008, but takes oﬀ signiﬁcantly from 2010 onwards (Figure 2). Transfers and
Table 4. Land put to diﬀerent crops in 2000 and 2016 (acres).
Crop 2000 2016
Maize 329.3 112.75
Rice 38.5 25
Sunﬂower 0.25 21.25
Sesame 0 57.75
Farmers 219 64
Notes: Diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant; χ2= 15870.5, df = 3, p = 0.001. With area
measured in acres the contingency table has too many low value cells, so the test
was conducted on diﬀerent units of area.
Source: Author’s Data.
Table 5. Net asset investment.
Asset acquisition 2001–2005 2006–2010 2011–2015
House construction 8 13 34
Metal roof 4 12 33
Oxen −1 3 8
Pigs/goats 2 2 12
Land 0 7 4
Plough/cart 0 4 15
Milling machine/motorbike −1 0 2
Source: Author’s Data.
Figure 2. Sources of investment in assets.
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support from relatives was only rarely mentioned by respondents (by just two) as being a
source of asset investment.
These price rises were driven by international demand and global rises in these com-
modity prices, not by changes in the marketing system (Figure 3). Other studies have
shown that sesame seed marketing arrangements in Lindi and Mtwara region, which
use respectively the District Stakeholders’ Price Setting Forum and the Warehouse
Receipt System, have been instrumental in fostering demand (Mashindano and Kihen-
zile 2013). However, in the case of Rukwa, there was no organisation of the marketing
arrangements by government oﬃcials. There has been no organisation of producers
into Agricultural Marketing Co-operatives (they were ﬁrst established in 2018). There
was merely a willing buyer in the form of a major agricultural exporter (the Export
Trading Company).
I was able to interview the pioneer farmer of modern varieties of sesame in Mtowisa. He
described a situation of gradual prices rises in the 2000s with demand kicking oﬀ in 2009
when many sesame seed buyers appeared in the village. From that point on prices sky-
rocketed reaching as much as 2000/= (around 1 USD) per kilo. This meant that farmers
were able to yield fantastic returns, of, I was told, between 250,000/= and 300,000/= per
sack.10 This is more than enough for a roll of metal rooﬁng, and only two rolls would
complete a standard sized house.
One story illustrates well the joy and surprise that these returns caused to farmers. I was
told that one farmer (we will call him Darius), who I met in the survey work and who had
not been particularly industrious or wealthy in 2000, went up to Sumbawanga to sell his
sesame in 2011. This was a collective enterprise, with many farmers loading their harvest
onto the lorry of the local shop owner to take it to the weighing depot. On receiving his
payment for two sacks of sesame (500,000/=) Darius was simply left in shock.11 He sat
down in a corner of the weighing room, still full of the hustle and bustle of heavy sacks
Figure 3. Global producer prices for sesame and sunﬂower (USD/tonne).
Source: FAOSTAT accessed 14th March 2019.
10This is a standard measure in Tanzania. It comprises 6 ‘debe’, which are 20 litre buckets of grain.
11Expressed by my respondent as ‘Amekaa bubuwazi’. This is a local version of ‘amepigwa mbumbuwazi’
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being moved, weighed and paid for, because he had never in his life expected to have so
much money. His friends had to guide him to a guest house where he could safely spend
the night. The next day he had recovered suﬃciently to buy metal sheets for a new house.
He built it that year and extended it the year after following further sales.
It is because of repeated stories like Darius’ that the appearance of Mtowisa, and the
daily lives of so many of its residents have been so thoroughly changed. Higher sesame
seed prices have given a substantial cash injection to many people’s livelihoods. Moreover,
regional production data suggest that this was not merely a local phenomenon. This crop
was scarcely grown when I was working there in 1999-2000. Yet, if the regional production
data are to be believed then, in the last four years, it has injected more than US $20 million
into the local economy (Table 6).
Patterns in improvement
Altogether 66% of the sample had experienced an increase in assets in some way over the
previous 16 years – but what subtler changes does this bald statistic conceal? There are two
general trends to note. First, the improvement in assets is general across most wealth
groups, but richer, more productive families have tended to be able to beneﬁt from the
cash crop returns more than families who were poorer and farming less in 2000.
The evidence for that is visible in the slightly diﬀerent performance of the diﬀerent cat-
egories of farmers I identiﬁed in 2000. Those who did not engage in kibarua work (casual
labour), or who only performed kibarua work for other people, are least likely to have
improved their asset base. Those with more assets and more engagement in kiabrua
work (as sellers or buyers) are most likely to have improved their assets (Table 7).12
Table 7. Asset growth performance by 2000 wealth group.
Wealth group in 2000 % of families improving asset base
Owns cows and a plough 63
Owns cows only 83
Owns either pigs, goats or a plough 82
None of assets above, pays for and performs kibarua 80
None of assets above, only pays for kibarua work 62
None of assets, neither pays for or performs kibarua 56
None of assets above, only performs kibarua work 50
Source: Author’s data.
Table 6. Sesame seed sales in Rukwa region.
Year Tons Tz Sh/kg Tz sh USD
2013–14 5528 1950 10,779,600,000 6,610,000
2014–15 4472 2000 8,944,000,000 4,710,000
2015–16 11,218 1277 14,325,386,000 6,570,000
2016–17 3705 1625 6,020,625,000 2,740,000
Source: Regional Production Figures.
12Casual labour is a contested aspect of peasant studies. Performing such labour can be associated with demeaning work
and be an aspect of class formation (Mueller 2011). I found that in Rukwa in 2000 performing kibarua work was not
necessarily associated with low status – it merged with reciprocal labour relations. It was possible to perform kibarua
for one person, and employ vibarua yourself at a later date. Kibarua can also be undertaken in order to save and
invest in a particular project. These days kibarua can be a sign of poverty – if it is the only means of support – and a
means of accumulation.
THE JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES 13
These diﬀerences are only tendencies, and do not denote contours of disadvantage. At
least 50% of the members of every group improved their assets.
The second trend is that female headed domestic units and smaller families tended to
improve their asset base less than dual-headed larger units. This trend reﬂects changes in
the lifecycle of domestic units where families with fewer dependents farm less, where
widows also farm less, and where both tend to support fewer dependents.
In addition, across the sample, in the midst of all this prosperity there were repeated, if
infrequent, incidents of continued poverty or impoverishment. Some families seem to
have been unable to beneﬁt from the changes transforming their neighbours. My
friends and informants explained this as an inability to plan aﬀairs (kupanga maisha)
such that their expenditure matched their means. Conversely, those who had been able
to improve their assets spoke also of restricting expenditure (bana matumizi, literally
clamp down on uses) to do so.
Others, although they had gained in assets, had lost in other ways, suﬀering from
divorce or death of partners, or simply the travails of old age, such that life now was decid-
edly unhappier. A couple of families had lost assets with which they began (land and/or
livestock) because they had been forced to sell because of various hardships. Building
an asset base requires good luck as well as wise decision making. There are some incidents
of altering asset portfolios. This applied to older families who sold land, or subdivided their
house plots, to fund house-building.
But if the general perspective across domestic units has been positive, what about
within them? What changes within families does the rising prosperity documented
above conceal? Within domestic units the changes experienced because of the investment
in assets seem to be reasonably well shared by men and women. Fipa society is one where
both men and women can own and dispose of land and livestock. Men also take more of a
role in child care than other Tanzanian societies. Weeding work loads, I was told (and saw),
are equally shared. The move to cash crops did not appear to have increased men’s
income, but women’s work.
Women have been disadvantaged, however, by the growing population of the village,
and the failure of water supplies to keep pace with people’s needs. Women, not men,
collect water, and there were repeated complaints about the time it took. Cooking (also
women’s work) now requires charcoal, as there are fewer trees on farms. There were
also three cases of female-headed households who had lost access to land through
family or neighbour disputes, or because their husbands had died leaving them childless,
and therefore with no access to their husband’s family land.
Finally, it bears repeating that assets are but one aspect of prosperity. The families I
visited, in the main, had enjoyed a recent cash injection from which they had invested
in assets. But there are many other dimensions of poverty that remain untouched by
this welcome change. The standards and ease of accessing health and educational ser-
vices, expenditure, care for the long term sick and elderly, basic measures of dignity
and so on are all ignored by this survey. Likewise, changes in nutrition, which are likely
in a move from subsistence to more commercial farming, are not mentioned. Our
methods and sources do not allow us to make the long term comparisons required to
document the changes that have occurred here.
The restrictions of looking at assets are best illustrated by our question ‘has life
improved for you now compared to 2000?’ In response some 44% of respondents felt
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that life was improving, 41% felt that it had gotten worse, and 15% of people felt it was as
hard as ever. When 56% of a sample insist that life is worse now, or as bad, as it was 16
years ago, and when life was indeed hard 16 years ago, then that majority is an important
ﬁnding. Particularly because, when answering that question, even those who felt life had
got better usually qualiﬁed that by insisting that the improvement was marginal at best.
Growing poverty and inequality
The other crucial diﬀerence between the state of the village now and earlier is that there
are trends towards class formation and inequality that indicate that the fortunes of new
cash crops are not universally enjoyed. The primary evidence for this is that there is
now a substantial group of households – around 44% of the village – who are character-
ised as not having their own lands and working for other people (Table 8). In 2000 only
27% of the population were borrowing or renting farms.
Casual labourers earn relatively low sums. With board and lodging included it can be just
2000/= per day, less than one dollar. Otherwise labourers are paid piece rates, which means
that weeding an acre of rice for 50,000 shillings can be 5 days work, or 10 days, depending
on the weed load. These are not sums that will make people wealthy quickly.
This large group exists in Mtowisa partly because the village has a relatively large col-
lection of housing stock to rent rooms in. There is often casual work to be had, and the
recent boom in sesame seed created a good deal of work. It has attracted immigrants
who rent rooms in the new houses sesame seed farmers have built. There are also
Table 8. Wealth groups and their distribution in the study site.
Group Typical characteristics
Number of domestic
units Proportion
1 Has a good house with a tiled ﬂoor and electricity (solar), and water
inside the house
A 20 acre farm, a shop and cars
Has goats, pigs and 100 cows
Has a huge store of crops – 100 sacks
Does not do casual labour
4 <1
2 Has a good home with cement walls/ﬂoor and solar and water at the
home;
Has a 10 acre farm; a pikipiki and a bicycle;
Has around 5 cows, goats and pigs;
Does not do casual labour
44 4
3 Has a metal roof and solar
Has a 5 acre farm and a bicycle
Owns 2 cows, 5 goats and a plough
Pays for kibarua work and does some kibarua work (ploughing with
family oxen)
116 11
4 Burnt brick house roofed with grass not metal roof; No electricity, no
water at home
Has chickens, goats and pigs but no cows; has a bicycle but not a
plough
Does kibarua work
369 34
5 Rented house; No solar
Dependent on casual labour
Some do not rent a farm; some rent a 0.5-2 acre farm
472 44
6 Homeless and Destitute 6 1
Unknown 71 7
Total 1082
Source: Author’s data.
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migrants who are drawn to the ﬁshing industries around Lake Rukwa. Nevertheless, it is
plain that the sesame seed boom is not a universally experienced blessing. Those
farmers with the land and means to farm it have proﬁted. But it is creating new forms
of diﬀerentiation. The sesame seed cash injection is concomitant with an incipient
process of class formation in the village which has seen the diﬀerentiation of families
into those who own their own land and those who can subsist by renting out their labour.
Ironically, however, at the same time as inequality appears to be increasing, local toler-
ance of it also appears to be growing. Focus groups at the feedback meeting in 2018
suggested that the ‘bad jealousy’ that used to hold people back is decreasing. The
same was discussed more informally in bars and during casual conversation. Commenta-
tors noted that the elders used to have the power to control where and when rain fell,
which was advantageous, but that these same elders would curse, and thus kill, people
who became too successful. Now both powers are gone. Wealth accumulation that was
once controlled by curses, death threats and fears now faces fewer impediments.13
Conclusion
The changes I have recorded here – both the increased wealth and the attendant rise in
inequality – derive in part because this village has becomemore closely integrated into the
global economy. The improved roads and communications infrastructure have seen crop
prices rise at the farm gate.
The developments at Mtowisa thus ﬁt with the ﬁfth element of Hall’s typology of forms of
land grabbing, that of ‘commercialisation in situ’ (Hall 2011). She describes this as small-scale
producers being incorporated into commercial value chains The attendant consequence, in
the context of a closed land frontier, is a new prevalence of landlessness that is the obverse
of the local forms of accumulation that I have documented here. As Hall and colleagues later
observed, the important issue for understanding poverty dynamics in such developments is
not whether this shows that small or large farms are better but rather ‘how diﬀerent farming
models co-exist and the ways in which poor people can navigate opportunities among
them’ (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017, 532). Accordingly as these forms of commercialisa-
tion and in situ accumulation spread throughout Tanzania we need to understand how the
opportunities and the misfortunes they present are negotiated.
In this instance wemust note that the driving forces of change are also ﬁckle. Sesame seed
in Rukwa has been hit by a disease which did not respond to treatment and which has made
the crop too unreliable to be farmed any more. The crop price ﬂuctuates considerably and
there is no government support mechanism to tide farmers over the vicissitudes of global
demand. Cash hungry farmers are now turning to more reliable cash crops (sunﬂowers) as
well as irrigated vegetables for their money. The mechanisms which allowed some farmers
to grow their asset base have not allowed sustained reduction in poverty.
Notwithstanding the mechanisms, the point is that assets matter if we are to under-
stand local poverty dynamics. They matter both as a means of external observers to
record change, and to local determinations of a good life. Understandings of poverty
dynamics in peasant populations have to take account of the local deﬁnitions and
13Whether or not this is actually true, it is a social fact, people believed it and that belief constrained their own personal
improvement plans.
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meanings of wealth and the things that peasants themselves count as important. They are
not well-served by measures of prosperity which preclude the possibility of counting
investment which matters to rural people – which is clearly the case with commonly
used consumption-based surveys. These are not well placed to track the ‘mores of con-
sumption and the utilities of wealth’ in Tanzanian contexts.14
Many of the families with whom I spoke place considerable signiﬁcance on the major
purchases that they will need to make in order to have a good life and provide for their
children. They will need to buy a plot (150,000/=), build a good house (300,000–
500,000/=), buy land (400,000/= an acre for unirrigated land), and buy oxen (200,000/=
a head) and a plough (150,000/=).15 And most of the revisited families in this sample
were taking signiﬁcant steps in building that asset base. These purchases, so vital in
local notions of progress, are not captured in poverty line data.
Or to put this more generally, understanding investment in productive assets and houses
will be central to answering three of the four questions of Bernstein’s haiku – ‘Who owns
what? Who does what? Who gets what? And, what do they do with it?’ (Bernstein 2010,
22). This will require more longitudinal studies which track and explain change in asset port-
folios. Doing so will help us to understand what forms of poverty persist amongst whom.
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